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Marino & Merskin’s (2019) (M&M) review of the empirical literature on sheep cognition should 
be understood in the context of two developments in psychology: (1) the enormous and growing 
body of research into nonhuman cognition and (2) the resulting theoretical shift towards a non-
anthropocentric psychological taxonomy. I will focus on (2), following a few remarks on (1). 
 M&M have added sheep to the list of nonhuman, nonprimate biological species whose 
cognitive capacities are being explored (e.g., slime moulds, plants, bacteria, corvids, 
cephalopods, cetaceans, etc.). Shettleworth’s (1993) complaint that there wasn’t much 
“comparative” in “comparative cognition” is being addressed in spectacular fashion in new 
species, newly developed species-appropriate experimental paradigms, and field work. As 
Adolphs (2019) notes, neural and modeling data should be added to the behavioral data to 
establish the presence of cognitive capacities (more on this below). Peña-Guzmán (2019) and 
Vonk (2019) raise two big reasons for caution regarding this research: inferences to the capacities 
of whole species from small nonrandom samples of individuals, and overinterpretation of 
behavioral data in terms of latent cognitive constructs. Such skepticism is warranted to avoid 
reading into the data what may not be there. We have no idea what the distribution of a given 
capacity might be within a species, and concerns about anthropomorphizing are not idle. 
However, the fact that both concerns arise is a clear indicator of a shift in thinking about the 
extent of mind in nature, from a humans-only prerogative to a widespread feature of evolved 
systems. 
 This shift is the theoretical aspect indicated above, which is motivated and supported by 
the research M&M review. The theoretical goal is not merely better understanding of what 
individual species can do. It is a psychology in which cognitive capacities are classified within a 
comprehensive structure that provides an overall understanding of the mind in nature. We are 
struggling to abandon the anthropocentric program criticized by Shettleworth in 1993, which can 
be conceptualized as a continuum (a psychological Great Chain of Being) with human cognition 
as its supreme expression anchoring one end, or as a single-hub network with human cognition 
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at the center. Instead, we are forming a hierarchical structure for psychology similar to that of 
the taxa or clades of biology. This is a structure that can realize what Shettleworth (1993; 2009) 
dubbed the ecological program, where we ask what capacities species have developed to flourish 
in their niches, not whether they can do something that approximates what humans can do 
(setting them up for failure). Independent development of the same advanced capacities in at 
least some cephalopods (see Mather 2019) already guarantees that the biological and emerging 
psychological taxonomies will stand in a complicated relationship. However, these structures will 
look far more similar than the biological and anthropocentric psychological structures now do. 
 This overarching theoretical project is advancing in fits and starts. An example is the way 
the so-called mirror test became the benchmark for self-recognition. It is a test designed for 
humans, as we are a visual species familiar with mirrors. Other species can pass the mirror test 
too, but it is hardly appropriate for species that depend on olfaction or audition (e.g., Cazzolla 
Gatti 2015). Yet the more the species that pass species-appropriate tests, the more the concept 
of “self” measured by such tests will come under sustained scrutiny. A concept already under 
such scrutiny is episodic memory. It was introduced by Tulving as recalling what, where, and 
when something occurred as well as conscious recollection of the event. Clayton et al. (2007) and 
Allen and Fortin (2013) argue that the requirement of conscious recollection as reported by 
verbal behavior, which was characteristic of Tulving’s human subjects, is not merely 
inappropriate for animals: We do not (yet?) have agreed-upon indicators of consciousness in 
nonhumans. Hence to include verbally reportable consciousness in the definition of episodic 
memory rules out the possibility of a nonhuman counterpart a priori.  
 The online Cognitive Atlas provides the start of a psychological taxonomy that 
systematizes psychological concepts and their relationships, but it is based on human studies 
(fMRI results and their associated tasks). Following Tulving, it defines episodic memory partly in 
terms of what can be explicitly stated, and categorizes it as a form of consciousness. As Adolphs 
urges, further anatomical and physiological research, including fMRI studies with nonhumans, is 
needed, although neuroscience is not immune to anthropocentrism (Parvizi 2009). These efforts 
must be seen as contributions to the development of a modern system of classification of 
psychological constructs that are non-anthropocentrically defined and based on evolutionary 
biological relationships, habitat similarities, mathematical and computational modeling, as well 
as natural and experimentally induced behavior, all approached from a cross-species perspective.  
 I have argued for recognition of this ongoing conceptual and structural revision elsewhere 
(Figdor 2018). Non-anthropocentric psychology is a work in progress, but what is already clear is 
that it will not justify our current moral taxonomy, where supreme human moral value 
corresponds to human psychological superiority and centrality (cf. Chapman & Huffman 2018). 
Unfortunately, our moral schema is not yet adjusting to these shifts in psychology. Domesticated 
sheep are a poster case of a species that deserves better treatment but is unlikely to get it very 
soon. We are highly motivated to maintain our superior moral status and the privileged 
treatment it affords to all humans over all nonhumans, and we have the cognitive tools to 
maintain that status in the face of unwelcome empirical evidence (e.g., Bastian et al. 2012). In 
the longer term, however, we may be forced to acknowledge that we aren’t at the center of the 
moral universe – or at least not there alone – any more than we are at the center of the 
psychological universe. That is a conceptual (and affective) change that empirical evidence alone 
will not induce. 
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